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A	lack	of	critical	public	debate:	Questioning	the	EU’s
support	for	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor
The	Southern	Gas	Corridor	is	an	initiative	put	forward	by	the	European	Commission	to	transport	natural
gas	from	the	Caspian	Sea	to	Southeastern	Europe	and	Italy.	As	Marco	Siddi	writes,	the	project	raises
several	important	economic,	security,	ethical	and	ecological	concerns.	He	argues	that	these	issues
have	not	been	properly	debated	at	the	European	level,	and	that	cheaper	and	less	problematic	sources
of	energy	could	have	been	discussed	as	options	to	diversify	Southeast	European	markets.
In	recent	weeks,	a	heated	debate	has	taken	place	in	Italy	concerning	the	construction	of	the	Trans	Adriatic	Pipeline
(TAP).	The	European	Commission	and	the	Italian	Confederation	of	Industrialists	consider	TAP	a	strategic	project
because,	in	their	view,	it	will	contribute	to	diversifying	Europe’s	imports	of	gas.	The	current	Italian	government,
however,	is	divided	on	the	issue	as	members	of	the	Five	Star	Movement,	the	larger	coalition	party	(the	other	coalition
party	being	the	far-right	League),	do	not	believe	the	project	is	necessary.	The	population	of	the	region	where	the	TAP
is	supposed	to	land	on	Italian	territory,	Apulia,	strongly	opposes	the	pipeline	because	they	fear	its	impact	on	the	local
tourist	industry	and	the	landscape.
While	the	views	of	citizens	most	affected	by	the	project	should	be	treated	with	utmost	respect,	the	Italian	debate	has
focused	on	a	narrow	set	of	issues	and	neglected	the	broader	complexities	of	the	TAP	project.	This	applies	to	both	its
supporters	and	detractors.	The	TAP	is	the	final	part	of	a	larger	infrastructural	project	known	as	the	Southern	Gas
Corridor	(SGC),	which	is	meant	to	ship	Azeri	gas	from	the	Caspian	Sea	to	Southeastern	Europe	and	Italy	via	a
3,500-kilometre	route	crossing	the	Caucasus	and	Turkey.	Besides	production	facilities	in	the	Caspian,	the	SGC
includes	the	South	Caucasus	pipeline	across	Azerbaijan	and	Georgia,	the	Trans	Anatolian	pipeline	(TANAP)	across
Turkey,	and	TAP,	which	runs	from	the	Greek-Turkish	border	to	the	Apulian	coast.	The	Southern	Gas	Corridor	has	an
estimated	cost	of	40-45	billion	dollars	and	involves	several	multinational	companies	(such	as	BP)	and	state-owned
companies	(such	as	the	Azeri	SOCAR).
Figure:	The	Southern	Gas	Corridor
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: A lack of critical public debate: Questioning the EU’s support for the Southern Gas Corridor Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-08-22
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/08/22/a-lack-of-critical-public-debate-questioning-the-eus-support-for-the-southern-gas-corridor/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Source:	Produced	by	the	author.
In	a	recent	paper,	I	have	outlined	the	challenges	facing	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor.	These	challenges	are	of	an
economic,	security,	ethical	and	ecological	nature,	and	have	been	largely	ignored	in	the	European	political	debate.
The	main	reason	for	this	is	the	blind	support	that	the	European	Commission	has	given	to	the	project.	The
Commission	sees	the	SGC	as	a	key	import	diversification	route	regardless	of	the	controversies	related	to	it.
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From	an	economic	perspective,	the	SGC	faces	challenges	related	to	the	availability	and	competitiveness	of	its	gas.
At	the	moment,	the	Shah	Deniz-2	field	in	the	Caspian	Sea	is	the	only	source	with	substantial	gas	volumes	that	will
feed	the	pipelines.	Shah	Deniz-2	should	be	able	to	reach	a	peak	output	of	16	billion	cubic	meters	per	year	(bcm/y)	by
2022	and	then	decline	after	2030.	Out	of	these	volumes,	6	bcm/y	have	been	contracted	to	Turkey,	1	bcm/y	to	each	of
Bulgaria	and	Greece	and	8	bcm/y	to	Italy	with	25-year	long-term	contracts.
As	the	research	of	the	Oxford	Institute	for	Energy	Studies	has	shown,	SGC	gas	could	be	price	competitive	in
Southeastern	Europe	and	possibly	Italy,	but	not	beyond	that	due	to	transportation	costs.	It	would	cover	no	more	than
2	percent	of	European	gas	demand,	and	hence	have	no	impact	on	European	gas	prices.	Claims	that	the	Southern
Gas	Corridor	could	cover	10-20%	of	European	gas	demand	are	highly	unrealistic.
The	strong	competition	of	cheaper	Russian	pipeline	gas	and	liquefied	natural	gas	(LNG)	from	the	US,	Qatar	and
other	producers	are	the	main	reasons	for	the	limited	effect	of	the	SGC	on	the	European	gas	market.	The	Southern
Gas	Corridor	could	have	had	more	impact	on	the	European	market	in	a	context	of	high	demand,	high	prices	and	no
strong	competition	from	liquefied	natural	gas,	as	during	the	2000s,	when	plans	for	it	were	first	conceived.	The	picture
has	long	changed.
Other	potential	suppliers	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	do	not	seem	to	have	the	interest	in,	or	be	in	the	position	of
using	this	infrastructure.	Iran	and	Turkmenistan	have	the	largest	gas	resources	(together	with	Russia)	in	the	Caspian
region.	However,	Iran	is	focusing	on	developing	liquefied	natural	gas	exports,	which	appear	more	profitable	than
long-distance	exports	via	pipeline.	The	recent	reintroduction	of	US	sanctions	further	undermines	prospects	for
Teheran’s	energy	cooperation	with	the	EU.
Over	the	last	decade,	Turkmenistan	has	focused	its	gas	export	policy	on	China.	Theoretically,	the	recent	agreement
on	the	legal	status	of	the	Caspian	Sea	could	facilitate	the	construction	of	a	Trans	Caspian	pipeline	from
Turkmenistan	to	Azerbaijan.	However,	the	cost	of	the	pipeline	is	estimated	at	2	billion	dollars,	and	Turkmen	gas	is
highly	unlikely	to	be	price	competitive	on	European	markets	due	to	transport	costs.	Moreover,	any	plans	to	export
Turkmen	gas	to	the	West	via	a	Trans	Caspian	pipeline	would	face	competition	with	already	existing	infrastructure
and	a	shorter	route	through	Russia.
Economic	arguments	are	compounded	by	security	considerations.	The	route	of	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	runs	very
close	to	highly	volatile	regions	and	ongoing	conflicts.	Nagorno-Karabakh	is	probably	the	most	explosive	one,	not
least	because	the	Armenian	and	Azeri	sides	facing	each	other	along	the	contact	zone	have	clashed	in	a	4-day	war
as	recently	as	April	2016.	In	military	exercises,	the	Armenian	air	force	has	simulated	attacks	on	Azeri	energy
infrastructure.
Further	west,	SGC	infrastructure	lies	within	easy	reach	of	the	separatist	republic	of	South	Ossetia,	which	was	the
theatre	of	the	August	2008	war	between	Russia	and	Georgia.	Once	it	has	reached	Turkish	territory,	the	Southern
Gas	Corridor	crosses	areas	where	the	Turkish	army	and	Kurdish	militias	have	clashed	in	the	recent	past.	In	August
2015,	for	example,	an	explosion	damaged	the	local	section	of	the	South	Caucasus	pipeline.
Following	the	failed	coup	of	July	2016	and	the	ensuing	tensions	in	West-Turkish	relations,	Turkey	itself	no	longer
appears	to	be	a	fully	reliable	transit	country	for	the	EU.	In	the	past,	Turkey	used	its	prospective	role	as	an	energy
transit	country	in	unrelated	negotiations	with	the	EU	regarding	Turkey’s	EU	accession	process.	The	key	transit	role	in
the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	would	further	strengthen	Ankara’s	political	leverage	vis-à-vis	the	EU,	which	has	already
been	boosted	by	the	2016	EU-Turkey	migration	deal.	Moreover,	Turkey	is	simultaneously	cooperating	with	Russia	on
the	Turkish	Stream	project,	which	is	at	an	advanced	stage	and	would	carry	large	quantities	of	Russian	gas	to	the
same	destination	markets	as	the	SGC	(thereby	questioning	the	economic	viability	of	the	latter).
The	European	Commission’s	unwavering	political	and	diplomatic	support	for	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	also	entails
ethical	and	ecological	issues.	The	SGC	involves	partnerships	with	authoritarian	regimes	such	as	Azerbaijan	and
Turkmenistan,	which	question	the	EU’s	proclaimed	commitment	to	promoting	norms	and	democratic	values	in	its
neighbourhood.	From	an	ecological	standpoint,	the	SGC	is	a	very	costly	project	that	contributes	to	locking	the	EU
into	fossil	fuel	consumption	in	the	long-term.	It	distracts	both	public	funding	and	attention	from	the	EU’s	climate
agenda.
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A	more	careful	and	critical	European	debate	would	have	been	necessary	before	committing	European	institutions
and	funds	to	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	including	the	controversial	issues	presented	above.	Alternative,	cheaper
and	less	problematic	sources	of	energy	could	have	been	discussed	as	options	to	diversify	Southeast	European
markets.	The	fact	that	this	has	not	happened	calls	into	question	both	the	decision-making	process	and	the	modus
operandi	of	EU	institutions.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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